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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES SICILIANO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9378 
Petition for Rehearing and Brief 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
James Siciliano, by his attorneys, respectfully petitions the 
above entitled Court for a rehearing and that the decision of 
the Court rendered August 24 in the above entitled case be 
reversed upon the grounds and for the reasons as follows: 
1. The Court erred in ruling that there was no evidence 
of negligence upon which liability could be predicated. 
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2. The Court erred in substituting its interpretation of the 
facts for the interpretation necessarily adopted by the jury. 
3. The Court erred in holding that the instruction on 
assumed risk constituted preju~icial error in this case. 
4. The errors of the Court deprived the plaintiff of rights 
given to him by the statutes and Constitution of the United 
States. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff and respondent prays that the 
Court make and enter its order granting a rehearing to plaintiff 
and respondent and reversing the decision of the Court entered 
herein on August 24, 1961, and reinstating the judgment of the 
District Court. 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS 
VIEW OF THE FAC1·s FOR THAT OF THE JURY. 
Specifications of error described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 
of the petition for rehearing are treated together in this portion 
of the argument. 
The facts in this case were susceptible to two inter-
pretations: 
1. The coil of wire was hung in a position of tension or 
spring with its ends held under among the strands. That such 
a piece of equipment is unsafe for ordinary use - that it con-
stitutes a trap - requires no elaboration. This was the plain-
tiff's theory. 
2. The coil of wire was hung with loose ends without 
tension in the manner wire is ordinarily hung in industrial 
plants. This was the defendant's theory. 
The defendant did not offer evidence, as the majority 
implies, that the prevailing practice was to hang coils of wire 
in a position of spring or tension with the ends locked under 
or among the coils. 
The jury was instructed that the hanging of a coil of wire 
with loose ends upon a post could not in and of itself con-
stitute negligence (Court Instruction No. 20, R. 58), but 
(!whether or not the manner in which this wire was hung on 
the post is negligence is for you to determine based upon all of 
the evidence and such reasonable inferences as may be drawn" 
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(ibid.) . Thus the jury was instructed that there could be no 
negligence on the defendant's theory. The jury necessarily 
adopted the plaintiff's theory and necessarily determined that 
the coil of wire in the particular circumstance of this lawsuit 
constituted a trap and was not a safe piece of equipment. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly, uniformly 
and pointedly held that the only question which the appellate 
court should review in considering whether the judgment is 
supported by evidence is whether the jury could find that em-
ployer negligence played any part at all in producing the injury, 
or stated another way, whether there is any evidence which with 
reason could be said to support the jury's findings. tl ••• Judges 
are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and if 
that test is made are bound to find that a case is made out, 
whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other 
possibilities." Rogers v. Missouri R.R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 500, 
1 L.Ed (2d) 493, 77 S. Ct. 443; rehearing denied 353 U.S. 941, 
1 L.Ed ( 2d) 764, 77 S. Ct. 808. 
One cannot read the cases following the Rogers case and 
have any doubt that its teaching represents the firm and con-
sidered judgment of the rna jority of the Court in cases of 
this kind. 
Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 512, 1 L.Ed 
(2d) 503, 77 S. Ct. 451; Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
(1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed (2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 680; Futrelle 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed 
(2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 682; Deen v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (1957) 
353 U.S. 925, 1 L.Ed (2d) 721, 77 S. Ct. 715; Thomson v. 
Texas & Pac. R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed (2d) 722, 
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77 S. Ct. 698; Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. R. Co. (1957) 353 
U.S. 360, 1 L.Ed (2d) 889, 77 S. Ct. 840; Ringhiser v. Chesa-
peake & 0. R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 901, 1 L. Ed (2d) 1286, 
77 S. Ct. 1093; McBride v. 1·oledo Terminal R. Co. ( 1957) 354 
U.S. 517, 1 L.Ed (2d) 1534, 77 S. Ct. 1398; Gibson v. Thomp-
son ( 1957) 355 U.S. 18, 2 L.Ed (2d) 1, 78 S. Ct. 2; Honey-
cutt v. Wabash R. Co. (1958) 355 U.S. 424, 2 L.Ed (2d) 380, 
78 S. Ct. 393; Ferguson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. ( 1958) 
356 U.S. 41, 2 L.Ed (2d) 571, 78 S. Ct. 671; Butler v. Whitman 
(1958) 356 U.S. 271, 2 L.Ed (2d) 754, 78 S. Ct. 734; Moore 
v. Terminal R.R. Assn. (1958) 358 U.S. 31, 3 L.Ed (2d) 24, 
79 S. Ct. 2; Harris v. Penn. R.R. Co. (1959) 361 U.S. 15, 
4 L.Ed (2d) 1, 80S. Ct. 22; Conner v. Butler (1959) 361 U.S. 
29, .:i L.Ed (2d) 10, 80 S. Ct. 21; Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean 
Shipping Corp. (1959) 361 U.S. 107, 4 L.Ed (2d) 142, 80 
S. Ct. 173; Davis v. Virginian Railway Co. ( 1960) 361 U.S. 
354, 4 L.Ed (2d) 366, 80 S. Ct. 387. Failure of the majority 
to refer to a single case since Rogers is significant, particularly 
in view of the authoritative suggestion that cc ••• earlier cases 
... should be examined in the light of the Rogers and Webb 
cases." Anno. 4 L.Ed ( 2d) 1787 at Note 8. It is submitted that 
Conner v. Butler,. supra, for instance, cannot be distinguished 
in principle. 
Rather than considering the simple question upon which 
appellate judges are counseled to (tfix their sights," the majority 
of the Court in the case at bar was apparently misled by a 
consideration of ( (insurer'' liability. The plaintiff in this case 
has never claimed that the defendant was an insurer. The jury 
was expressly instructed upon the defendants own request (De£. 
Request No. 1, R. 23) that the defendant was not an insurer 
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of plaintiff's safety (Instruction No. 10, R. 48). It is equally 
clear, however, that as a matter of law, the plaintiff is not an 
"insurer" of his own safety. In this connection the defendant 
itself effectively proved on cross examination of plaintiff that 
he did not anticipate and could not have foreseen the dangerous 
condition of the coil of wire as it hung upon the nail. Yet the 
effect of the decision of this Court effectively requires the plain-
tiff to assume the total burden of his loss. 
Instead of deciding the case upon the tangent of insurer 
consideration - a theory not in issue in the case - it is sub-
mitted that the attention of the Court should focus on two 
simple questions: 
1. Can this Court find as a matter of law that the coil of 
wrie was not in a position of tension as a trap as was necessarily 
found by the jury? 
2. Can this Court find as a matter of law that a coil of 
wire hanging on a nail as a trap in a position of spring or tension 
was a safe piece of equipment? 
An affirmative answer to either of these questions simply 
cannot withstand objective scrutiny. 
The United State Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
substitution of the judgment of an appellate court for that 
of a jury, rather than a determination as to whether the jury's 
theory could be supported on any reasonable basis, constitutes 
impairment of a federal right. Note 13, Rogers v. Mo. R.R. 
supra and the cases cited supra, beginning with Webb v. Ill. 
Cent. R.R. See opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Harris v. 
Penn. R.R. Co., supra. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUC-
TION TO THE EFFECT THAT HE DID NOT 
ASSUME THE RISK OF EMPLOYER NEGLIGENCE. 
The Court's discussion of the instruction on assumption 
of risk evidences unwarranted solicitude for the railroad com-
pany. Inasmuch as the holding that the judgment was not 
supported by competent evidence would have disposed of the 
case and no new trial would be possible if that theory prevails, 
the discussion of assumption of risk is pure dicta. It is a gratuity 
to the defendant. 
The majority admits that the issue of assumption of risk 
may be raised by the evidence and inferences from the evidence 
as well as by pleadings. In such a case, says the rna jority, a 
"cautionary instruction" may be appropriate so that improper 
inferences may be ccdispelled." There is no explanation in the 
opinion as to why this case falls outside that description. 
The opinion of /Mr. Justice Black in the case cited by the 
majority, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. (1943) 318 U.S. 
54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed 610, contains a resume of the history 
of the assumption of risk doctrine. Both historically and prac-
tically, the doctrine was intertwined with considerations con-
tributory negligence. Originally the concepts were loosely inter-
changeable. In fact, the very reason for the adoption of the 
1939 amendment was the insurmountable ((difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk" as a result of the ((niceties if not the casuistries of dis-
tinguishing between (them)" (ibid. page 63, U.S. Reporter 
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614, L.Ed). As a result of the amendment, it is now clear that 
an employee does not assume the risk of employer negligence. 
Prior refinements were discarded. 
The majority's confidence in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 
((coup" is misplaced. All that he said in its context, and leaving 
aside the professorial embellishments, was that an employee 
did not assume the risk of employer negligence. If in some other 
sense the term ((assumption of risk" may be a ((hazardous legal 
tool," how can it ((create confusion" in the sense and context 
in which it was used by the trial court here: 
ny ou are instructed that at the time of the incident 
we are concerned with, both plaintiff and defendant 
were engaged in interstate commerce, and plaintiffs 
claim for recovery is therefore governed by the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. This act provides in substance 
that every common carrier railroad shall be liable in 
damages to any employee who suffers injury while 
employed by such carrier, resulting in whole or in part 
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or 
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or 
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its appliances, 
machinery or equipment, except where the injury results 
solely from the negligence of the one so injured. 
((Any such employee shall not be held to have as-
sumed the risks of his employment occasioned by such 
negligence. 
((In actions against such carrier, the fact that the 
injured employee may have been guilty of contributory 
negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall 
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount 
of negligence, if any, attributable to such employee. 
((Under this statute, the test of liability is simply 
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion 
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that the negligence of the defendant employer played 
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury for 
which damages are sought. 
CCI£ the injury is caused solely by the negligence of 
the employee, or if the defendant is not negligent, then, 
of course, no recovery may be had by said employee." 
The defense in this case was in substance that the wire 
was hung with loose ends on a nail in accordance with accepted 
industry practice. Defendant asserted that the plaintiff negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiffs 
position was that the coil was in a position of tension or spring 
with the ends locked among or beneath the strands so that when 
the weight was released from the ends of the coil, one of them 
flipped into plaintiff's eye. 
The defendant requested that the Court give an instruction 
that the defendant was not an insurer. (Defendant's Requested 
Instructions 1 and 13, R. 23, 33; Court's Instruction No. 10, 
R. 48.) The Court instructed the jury in substance that if the 
coil of wire was hung in accordance with generally accepted 
practice, defendant could not be liable. How could the Court's 
instruction on the assumption of risk mean more in its context 
than this: CtPlaintiff did not assume the risk of the use of the 
coil of wire if it was unsafe for ordinary use." 
There was a careful, painstaking description of negligence, 
contributory negligence, proximate cause, and the Court ex-
plained to the jury that cc ••• the law recognizes that injuries 
to an employee can occur during the course of his work without 
fault or negligence on the part of either the railroad or the 
employee. 
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tel£ you believe from the evidence that Mr. Siciliano's 
injuries were caused by accident and without negligence on the 
part of the railroad, then you must return a verdict in favor 
of the railroad and against the plaintiff " (Instr. No. 8, 
R. 46). 
Thus the assumption of risk issue, at least insofar as it is 
intertwined with contributory negligence, was raised by defen-
dant's evidence and the inference it claimed for its evidence. 
The instruction as given in its context cannot be said to be error, 
let alone be confusing. 
Even, however, if we accept the majority's premise for the 
argument and assume that the issue was not raised here by 
evidence or inferences, the giving of the instruction can hardly 
be said to be prejudicial. Defendant requested, and the Court 
gave, presumably as a ((cautionary instruction," Instruction 
No. 8 that te ... the railroad company is not an insurer of the 
safety of its employees." How did that issue become relevant? 
Who placed it in the case? Plaintiff has never claimed, either 
directly or by inference, that defendant was an insurer. 
If the defendant is entitled to have an instruction that it 
is not an insurer, a straw man issue which it invented itself, 
how does it become prejudicial for plaintiff to have a °Caution-
ary instruction" that plaintiff does not assume the risk of 
defendant's negligence? 
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to instruction along the lines of that 
given here. In Tiller v. Atlantic supra the ruling was that 
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that plaintiff 
10 
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assumed a risk of employment, and in Texas & Pac. R.R. v. 
Buckles CCA 5 ( 1956) 232 F (2d) 257, the other federal case 
cited by the majority opinion in the case at bar, the ruling was 
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that plaintiff 
assumed any risk of employment. It does not follow that a 
plaintiff is not entiled to a suitable instruction that he does not 
assume the risk of employer negligence. In fact, in the Texas 
& Pac. R.R. case, supra} which the majority says applies the 
Frankfurter language, the following instruction was held 
"clearly correct" (p. 263, Note 13): 
CCW e now instruct you on the question of assumption 
of risk. In any suit brought against a railroad under this 
law to recover damages for injury to an employee, such 
employee does not assume any of the risks of his employ-
ment in any case where the injury resulted, in whole 
or in part, from the negligence of any of the agents 
or employees of the railroad." 
The Seventh Circuit has ruled twice that the giving of an 
instruction similar to that given in the case at bar at the request 
of an employee was not erroneous. Larsen v. Chicago and 
N.W. R. Co. (1948) CAA 7, 171 F (2d) 841, 846; Wantland 
v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1956) CCA 7, 237 F (2d) 921, 
926. In the latter case the Court stated: 
c CThe Railroad also insists that the trial court erred 
in instructing the jury that the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act provides that an employee shall not be held 
to have assumed the risk of his employment. This court 
had occasion to pass on a similar contention in Larsen 
v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 7 Cir. 171 F. 2d 841, 846, 
where it was held that such an instruction was not 
erroneous.'' 
11 
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The opinion of the majority here upon the instruction in 
question is squarely opposed to the opinions of two circuit 
courts. Rights under a federal statute being in issue, the Fed-
eral Rules should prevail. Moreover, the holding of the Fifth 
Circuit in the Texas & Pac. R.R. case relied upon by the majority 
is squarely against it. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
that case. ( 1955) 351 U.S. 984, 100 LEd. 1498, 76 S. Ct. 1052. 
The judgment herein dated August 24 should be reversed; 
the opinion should be withdrawn. The judgment of the District 
Court should be reinstated and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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